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TYPES OF HEAD OF STATE IN EUROPEAN POLITICS 
 
Robert Elgie 
 
This chapter provides an overview of European Heads of State. It provides basic 
information about the way in which Heads of State are selected, how long they 
remain in office, and how powerful they are. There are three general themes. 
First, whereas monarchs have no substantive role in the political process, there is 
great variation among the set of European presidents. Second, variation in 
presidential power is a better predictor of the different ways in which European 
presidents operate than how they are selected. Thirdly, variation in presidential 
power is itself the result of a mix of constitutional powers, party politics and 
behavioural norms. These themes are based on an analysis of 36 European 
countries, the 28 members of the European Union, plus five non-EU countries in 
the Balkans — Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia — and three 
non-EU countries in Western Europe — Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. 
 
Selecting the Head of State 
 
We can make a basic definitional distinction between monarchies and republics. 
In a European context, a monarchy is headed by a king or queen, or in the case of 
Luxembourg by a Grand Duke. In a monarchy, the Head of State is selected 
through some process of hereditary succession, or birthright. For example, until 
2013 the rule of male primogeniture still applied in the UK. This meant that if the 
reigning monarch had both a son and a daughter and the daughter was older 
than the son, the son was still the first in line to the throne. However, like most 
other European monarchies, the UK has now abandoned this rule. Here, as 
elsewhere, the monarch’s eldest child is first in the line of succession. In Europe, 
all monarchies can now be classed as parliamentary monarchies, implying that 
the monarch has few powers and the prime minister is dominant within the 
executive (see below). This classification helps to distinguish European 
monarchies from absolute monarchies that can still be found elsewhere, notably 
in some Gulf States. There, the monarch is still a powerful figure. 
 In European republics, the Head of State is a president. Presidents can be 
chosen either indirectly by representatives of those elected by the people, or by 
the people directly. When the president is elected indirectly, then we can call the 
regime a parliamentary republic. Indirectly elected presidents are selected by an 
electoral college, but there is great variation in the type of electoral college used. 
For example, in Hungary the president is elected by members of the sole house 
of parliament, the National Assembly. By contrast, the German president is 
elected by a specially convened Federal Convention, which comprises the 
members of the lower house of parliament, the Bundestag, and an equal number 
of members elected by the sub-national parliaments of the Länder. For its part, 
Estonia mixes these two methods. Members of parliament meet to elect the 
president in the first instance. However, if no candidate is elected after three 
ballots, then a special electoral college is convened, comprising members of 
parliament and one representative from each local authority in the country. For 
their part, directly elected presidents have been selected in two ways. The 
standard format is simply a popular vote as in France. However, from 1925-1988 
inclusive Finland had a different system, whereby there was a popular vote for 
members of an electoral college, which in turn elected the president. This system 
resembled the situation in the US. Some people wish to make a distinction 
between a French-style directly elected president and a Finnish-style popularly 
elected president. Now, though, with the change in the Finnish system, all 
European directly elected presidents are chosen by a direct popular vote. 
 While there is a basic definitional distinction between European 
monarchies and republics, it is standard to differentiate between different types 
of systems by adding a second classification rule that captures whether or not the 
government is collectively responsible to the legislature. In all parliamentary 
monarchies, this is the case. For example, in Britain Prime Minister James 
Callaghan's government lost a confidence vote in the House of Commons in 
March 1979, triggering the general election that brought Margaret Thatcher to 
power. In all European parliamentary republics, with the exception of 
Switzerland, the government is also collectively responsible to the legislature. So, 
in the Czech Republic Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek's government lost a vote 
of no confidence in the Chamber of Deputies in March 2009 and resigned. 
Switzerland aside, we class both parliamentary monarchies and republics simply 
as parliamentary regimes. We class the Swiss case as an assembly-independent 
regime. When we apply this second classification rule to countries with a directly 
elected president, we can distinguish between semi-presidential regimes where 
there is a prime minister and where the government is collectively responsible to 
the legislature and presidential regimes where there is no prime minister and 
where the government is not responsible to the legislature. So, in Romania Prime 
Minister Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu's government was defeated in a vote of no 
confidence in April 2012. This is consistent with classifying Romania as semi-
presidential. In Europe, there are many countries with a semi-presidential 
constitution (Elgie ed. 1999). However, while across the world there are many 
presidential regimes, notably in the US and Latin America, in Europe there is 
only one such country, Cyprus. (See Table 17.1). In Cyprus, the president is both 
head of state and head of government. So, there is no prime minister. 
 Over time, there has been a shift from monarchies to republics and, within 
republics, from parliamentary republics to semi-presidential regimes (Elgie, 
2012). We can explain this shift normatively. We are now living in an era of 
representative liberal democracy. A key element of such a system is the notion 
that the people can hold accountable those who make decisions on their behalf. 
Monarchs cannot be held accountable. Therefore, when newly independent or 
democratizing countries have to make a choice about which constitutional 
structure they wish to adopt, there is now usually little support for the creation 
of or return to a monarchy. For example, in Iceland a republican constitution was 
overwhelmingly approved in May 1944. In Italy a referendum in June 1946 
rejected the return of the monarchy albeit narrowly. In Greece, the restoration of 
the monarchy was rejected in a referendum in 1974. In the same year Malta, 
which had been independent since 1964 with the British monarch as Head of 
State, passed a law declaring itself a republic. Only Spain reverted to a monarchy 
at the point of democratization in 1975. The 'republicanisation' of European 
political life can be seen perhaps best in Bulgaria (Vassilev 2010). Here, the 
monarchy was abolished in 1946 with the advent of a people's democracy. 
However, the heir to the Bulgarian throne, Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, returned 
to Bulgaria in 1996 and formed a political party, the National Movement for 
Stability and Progress, which won the 2001 parliamentary election. As Simeon 
Borisov Sakskoburggotski he served as Prime Minister from 2001-2005. This 
example demonstrates that the republican system is now firmly entrenched in 
Europe. 
 A similar logic explains why there has been a shift from parliamentary 
republics to semi-presidential regimes. Direct election is a very clear expression 
of popular will. Therefore, even if the indirect election of the president is 
fundamentally consistent with the principles of representative liberal democracy, 
direct election is normatively attractive. This helps to explain why most of the 
countries of the former communist block in Europe chose a directly elected 
president. It also helps to explain why parliamentary republics have 
subsequently switched to semi-presidentialism. This shift occurred in Slovakia in 
1999 and the Czech Republic in 2013. However, we need to add a further element 
to explain the popularity of semi-presidentialism. While the US is a very stable 
presidential democracy where power is shared at the federal level between the 
President, the Congress and the Supreme Court, presidentialism in other 
countries has often been associated with very powerful, sometime authoritarian 
presidents. For this reason, pure presidentialism is often viewed as an 
unattractive or risky choice for newly independent or democratizing countries. 
Therefore, even though most former communist countries in Europe chose a 
directly elected president, none chose a pure presidential regime. The combined 
effect of these factors has made semi-presidentialism a very common regime type 
in contemporary Europe, though when parliamentary monarchies and republics 
are combined there are still as many parliamentary regimes in Europe as semi-
presidential systems. 
A puzzle, though, remains. If monarchies are no longer normatively 
attractive, why do they continue to exist? In part, the answer is historical. During 
the Second World War, West European monarchs were often associated with 
opposition to German expansionism or occupation. Therefore, when democracy 
returned to Western Europe in the post-war period there was little appetite to 
abolish the monarchy. In Belgium, where the king’s attitude to occupation was 
more questionable, a referendum was held in which a majority still voted to 
restore Leopold III to the throne. The answer is also partly political. In Western 
Europe monarchs no longer play any substantive role in the political process. 
Therefore, they do not challenge the essential normative principle of 
representative liberal democracy. The people rule indirectly through elections to 
the legislature and the responsibility of the prime minister and government to 
the legislature. If monarchs systematically tried to influence the political process, 
then we could safely predict that there would be a concerted move to abolish 
them. What all this suggests is that even if existing monarchies may endure, new 
ones are unlikely to be created. The result is that if the EU were ever to create the 
position of Head of State, we can be sure that the system would not be a 
monarchy. 
Table 17.1 Type of political regimes in Europe about here 
 
Presidential elections 
 
Most European countries are republics. All republics hold presidential elections. 
We have seen that some countries elect their president indirectly, whereas others 
elect them directly. How do European presidential elections operate? 
 There is considerable variation in the rules for electing presidents 
indirectly. We have already seen that some indirectly elected presidents are 
selected solely by members of the legislature, some by a specially convened 
electoral college, and some by a mix of both. However, there is further variation 
in the precise mechanisms by which electoral colleges choose a president. All 
parliamentary republics require at least an absolute majority of votes in the first 
instance for the president to be elected and most require a super-majority, but 
thereafter some countries have a system that allows a candidate to be chosen 
relatively quickly whereas others have a system that can lead to a very 
protracted election. In Germany, there is a maximum of three rounds of voting. 
At the first two rounds a candidate needs to win an absolute majority of votes in 
the Convention. At the third round, a simple plurality is required. Therefore, the 
process of election is completed relatively quickly. In Italy, though, a two-thirds 
majority is required at the first two ballots and an absolute majority thereafter. 
What is more, there is no limit to the number of ballots. So, in Italy in 1971 it took 
15 days and 23 ballots before a president was chosen. In Estonia, when 
parliament fails to elect a president, the convening of the broader electoral 
college means that the whole process can take a considerable time. For example, 
the first round of the 2001 Estonian presidential election took place on 27 August, 
but President Arnold Rüütel was only elected on 21 September. In Greece there is 
a strong incentive for parliamentarians to reach agreement, but there is no 
guarantee they will do so. Here, the president is elected solely by deputies. At 
the first two ballots a two-thirds majority is required, whereas at the third ballot 
a three-fifths majority is necessary. If no candidate reaches this figure at the third 
ballot, then the legislature is dissolved and the process begins again except at the 
third ballot under the new parliament a simple plurality is required, thus 
guaranteeing a successful election. As a general rule, parties collectively and 
deputies individually do not wish to see the legislature dissolved for fear of 
losing support. Partly for that reason, three presidential elections in Greece have 
been decided at the third ballot, thus avoiding a dissolution. In 1990, though, a 
newly elected parliament was so split that a new election suited the various 
parties. When the presidential election went to the third ballot, the three-fifths 
majority was not found and new parliamentary elections were held. Only after 
the legislative election was a president successfully chosen. The whole process 
began on 19 February and ended on 4 May. Table 17.2 provides information 
about the number of ballots required to elect the president in Europe’s 
parliamentary republics. 
 Table 17.2 The number of ballots required to elect the president in 
parliamentary republics about here 
 We can see, therefore, that there is great variation in the rules for electing 
presidents indirectly and that the process of election can be very protracted, but 
how competitive are elections? Table 17.3 shows that with the striking exception 
of the Italian case the first ballot of indirect presidential elections tends to be 
contested by a relatively small number of candidates, though it should be noted 
that in some countries new candidates are allowed to enter the contest at a later 
ballot to try to generate the necessary majority. Table 17.3 also shows that 
uncontested elections are not uncommon. For example, in Greece where 
partisanship is very pronounced and where the 1990 presidential election took 
nearly three months, four presidential elections have nonetheless been 
uncontested since 1975. Usually, uncontested elections occur when an incumbent 
president wishes to stand for re-election as in Latvia in 2003. That said, in 
Hungary the 2012 presidential election was contested by only one candidate 
because none of the opposition parties had sufficient seats in parliament to 
nominate a candidate on their own and because they preferred not to run a joint 
candidate when the government’s candidate was almost certain to be elected at 
the first ballot. Thus, an uncontested first ballot does not necessarily signify the 
presence of a consensus president. Overall, we can see that indirect presidential 
elections vary greatly in their competitiveness. Some are divisive and protracted, 
but a surprising number are uncontested. We can explain this difference by 
reference to party politics. Political parties dominate indirect presidential 
elections. If the party system is highly competitive and parties see little incentive 
to compromise, then the presidential election can be very divisive. However, if 
parties feel that they have little to gain from such a competition, then they will 
engineer a compromise candidate or allow an incumbent president to be re-
elected without a contest. As we shall see, indirectly elected presidents usually 
have few powers, so the stakes are often not very high. This can encourage 
compromise candidates and/or discourage opposition parties from standing 
candidates and forcing a contest they might lose. 
 Table 17.3 The number of candidates at the first ballot of presidential 
elections in parliamentary republics about here 
 Turning to direct elections, the rules for electing the president are much 
more uniform. With the exception of Ireland, which uses a one-round system of 
preferential voting, all European countries use a two-round runoff system to 
elect the president. In this system, a number of candidates stand at the first 
round, but, assuming no candidate wins an absolute majority of the votes cast, 
only the leading two candidates are allowed to stand at the second round. In 
most countries the rules for nominating candidates are also relatively similar. 
Usually, candidates can stand for election if they receive a certain number of 
signatures from citizens. The number of signatures required varies roughly as a 
function of the population of the country. That said, in France and Ireland there 
is no provision for citizen involvement. Instead, elected representatives dominate 
the process. Where signatures are the basis of the nomination process, the 
threshold is usually such that extremely determined well-known individuals and 
representatives of small parties can stand, whereas utterly frivolous candidates 
are effectively excluded. The rules in France have the same effect. In Ireland, 
established political parties have dominated the candidate selection process at 
least until recently. Overall, Table 17.4 shows that the average number of 
candidates in countries with direct elections is greater than the equivalent 
number for countries with indirect elections where parliamentary parties 
dominate the nomination process. Partly for that reason, Table 17.4 shows that in 
contrast to parliamentary republics uncontested elections are very rare in 
countries with direct elections, though they are common in both Iceland and 
Ireland where, as we shall see, the president is a figurehead institution with 
scarcely any political powers. That said, in countries with direct presidential 
elections political parties are usually the main vehicles by which signatures are 
collected. So, elections are still contested predominantly by party candidates. 
More than that, there is a big difference between standing for election and 
standing with a chance of winning or even doing well at the election. So, 
typically, the battle to win through to the second round is almost always 
confined to a handful of well-known party figures. Lesser-known 'citizen' 
candidates or candidates from very small parties often trail far behind, rarely 
able to make a dent in the public consciousness. Accordingly, Table 17.4 provides 
the figures for the effective number of presidential candidates at the first ballot of 
European direct presidential elections. These figures give a sense of how 
competitive direct elections are on average. They show that the effective number 
of first-round presidential candidates in countries with direct elections is higher 
than the average number of candidates at the first ballot of countries with 
indirect elections. This reflects the more open nomination process. Even so, the 
figures also show that in direct elections the real competition for the presidency 
is usually restricted to a relatively small number of candidates. 
 Table 17.4 Direct presidential elections in Europe about here 
 The main difference, though, between the effect of indirect and direct 
presidential elections concerns the nature of election campaigns. In countries 
with indirect elections, the election of the president is usually a major political 
event. However, by and large the contest takes place within a relatively restricted 
time period and mainly within the parliamentary arena. Candidates do not 
prepare a manifesto. There are no televised debates between them. There may 
not even be the opportunity for candidates to speak in parliament in support of 
their candidacy. Instead, the election is an elite party-centred affair. It may 
require party leaders to meet to try to agree a common candidate, but most of the 
politicking goes on behind closed doors. By contrast, direct presidential election 
campaigns look very different. All but the most minor candidates prepare some 
sort of manifesto, outlining their vision for the country. With the exception of 
Iceland, all countries now hold televised debates between all or at least some of 
the presidential candidates. Even prior to the official period of campaigning, 
which is usually around a month before the election date, candidates may hold 
mass rallies and public meetings for their supporters. They are likely to tour 
around the country. There is also political advertising or official election 
broadcasts on television. Indeed, the total cost of campaigning can be very large 
indeed. In addition, in some countries, such as France, the major parties now 
hold US-style primary elections to choose their presidential candidate. This 
means that formal campaigning begins up to a year before the election date itself. 
More than that, in countries such as France maneuvering for the presidency takes 
place years in advance. Here, the presidential election is the centrepiece of the 
electoral process. The political system is defined by the presidential election. 
Therefore, would-be candidates are making decisions with the presidential 
election in mind years ahead of any official campaigning. Overall, there are great 
differences between countries with directly and indirectly elected presidents in 
relation to election campaigns. 
 We have seen that direct elections are somewhat more competitive than 
indirect elections and that campaigning varies greatly as a function of the 
particular mode of election. However, does it make a difference to the type of 
person who is elected? There is some evidence that parliamentary republics are 
more likely to elect non-partisan presidents, or at least presidents who were not 
holding elected political office at the time of their election. For example, in Latvia 
two of the four presidents since the collapse of communism have been drawn 
from outside parliament. Here, in 1999 five ballots failed to generate the required 
majority to elect the president. At the sixth ballot a figure from outside 
parliament was nominated and a majority was found. Similarly, in the second 
presidential election in Kosovo in 2011 a non-partisan candidate was found to 
ensure that a protracted or divisive selection process did not damage the political 
process. If we include ambassadors, judges and central bankers, there is an 
equivalent example in every parliamentary republic, even if most presidents 
have held representative political office prior to being elected as head of state. 
Indeed, in Italy and Greece the vast majority of presidents have been long-
standing party figures. With directly elected presidents, the power of the office 
makes a difference. In countries with directly elected but weak presidents, the 
situation is not very different from countries with indirectly elected presidents. 
For example, in countries such as Austria, Finland and Slovenia there have been 
presidents from outside representative party politics, even if most presidents 
have been explicitly partisan. In Iceland and Ireland, where the presidency is 
very weak, non-partisan presidents have been more common still. However, in 
countries where the president is more than a figurehead, such as Cyprus, France 
and Romania, then party heritage is a necessary component for election. In these 
countries, the stakes are high and political parties are keen to hold the presidency. 
So, the power of the president is a better predictor of the type of person who 
serves as president in European republics than the mode of election. 
 
The duration in office of Heads of State 
 
The amount of time that Heads of State remain in office varies greatly between 
monarchies and republics. In monarchies, the king or queen cannot be voted out 
of office by the legislature, there are no elections at which public can choose to 
replace them, and there are no term limits. This means that monarchs can serve 
indefinitely. In the UK Queen Elizabeth II has reigned since 1952. Monarchs in 
Denmark and Norway have reigned from the early 1970s. That said, there is a 
tendency among European monarchs to abdicate at a certain point. For example, 
Queen Juliana of the Netherlands reigned from 1948 until her abdication in 1980. 
She died in 2004. Her daughter, Queen Beatrix, reigned from 1980 until 2013 
when she in turn abdicated at the age of 75. Thus, even though European 
monarchs serve for a much longer period than presidents, they often limit their 
reign. What is more, the decision to step down is usually entirely personal. Given 
monarchs no longer play any meaningful role in the political process, there is 
rarely any public or political pressure for them to abdicate. The exception is 
Leopold III of Belgium. As noted earlier, a referendum in March 1950 supported 
the restoration of Leopold III to the throne. However, when he returned to 
Belgium from exile in Switzerland in July 1950, strikes broke out in opposition. 
Almost immediately, Leopold III declared that he would abdicate in favour of his 
son, who became Baudoin of Belgium reigning from 1951 until his death in 1993. 
 Turning to republics, the standard European president serves for a five-
year term and can be re-elected only once. In fact, this rule applies to 19 of 
Europe's 27 parliamentary republics, semi-presidential and presidential regimes. 
There is some variation. The presidents of Ireland and Italy serve for a seven-
year term and the presidents of Austria and Finland for six years. By contrast, the 
presidents of Iceland and Latvia serve for only four years. Also, the presidents of 
Cyprus, Iceland, Italy and Malta are not term limited and can, in theory, be re-
elected indefinitely. Even so, no Maltese president has served for more than one 
term and in 2013 Giorgio Napolitano was the first Italian president ever to be re-
elected for a second term. In some countries, the combination of long presidential 
terms and/or the absence of term limits means that certain presidents have 
served for a considerable period of time. In Ireland four presidents have each 
served for 14 consecutive years. In France, President François Mitterrand served 
for the same length of time prior to the reduction in the president's term from 
seven to five years in 2000. In Iceland both President Ásgeir Ásgeirsson and 
President Vigdís Finnbogadóttir served for 16 consecutive years. What is more, 
the current incumbent, President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, was re-elected for a 
fifth term in 2012, having already served for 16 years. However, the record still 
lies with President Urho Kekkonen in Finland. He was in office from 1956-1982 
prior to the introduction of the two-term limit there. Finally in this regard, it is 
worth noting that presidents tend not to return to the office after having stepped 
down. Only three former presidents have been re-elected after a period away 
from the presidency. They are Konstantinos Karamanlis in Greece, Valdas 
Adamkus in Lithuania, and Ion Iliescu in Romania. So, while former presidents 
often continue in political life either domestically or in international 
organisations, they rarely return to the top post. 
 In contrast to monarchs, presidents can be held accountable for their 
actions. There are plenty of cases of incumbent presidents failing to be re-elected. 
If we confine ourselves solely to directly elected presidents, in Poland President 
Wałęsa was elected in 1990 but defeated in 1995. In Cyprus, two incumbent 
presidents have stood for re-election only to be defeated. The same is true in 
France and Romania. In Slovakia Rudolf Schuster won the country's first-ever 
direct presidential election in 1999, winning 47.4 per cent of the vote at the first 
ballot. However, when he stood for re-election in 2004 he won only 7.4 per cent 
of the vote, coming a distant fourth. In Bulgaria, President Zhelev won the 1992 
election, but failed to win his party's nomination for the 1996 election and did not 
stand. By contrast, in Iceland, Ireland and Portugal, where there is a long history 
of presidential elections, no incumbent has failed to be re-elected. These 
countries have weak directly elected presidents, particularly Iceland and Ireland, 
again suggesting that where the president is a figurehead the office is less likely 
to be contested. That said, in Slovenia, where the president is also very weak, 
President Türk failed to be re-elected in 2012. 
 In addition to these and similar cases, a small number of European 
presidents have had to leave office early. Two presidents have resigned under 
pressure from a scandal in which they were implicated. In 2010 President 
Christian Wulff of Germany resigned amidst allegations of financial wrongdoing 
(Kubiak 2012). In 2012 President Pál Schmitt of Hungary resigned when he was 
accused of plagiarising his PhD thesis. Two presidents have resigned when the 
exercise of their role has been challenged. In Germany, President Horst Köhler 
resigned in May 2010 when he was criticized for comments he made in relation 
to alleged links between Germany's military missions overseas and the country's 
trading relations. There was no obligation for him to resign, but he decided to do 
so when he received little support from the political class generally. A similar 
situation occurred in Ireland in 1976 (Gallagher 1977). Here, President Cearbhall 
Ó Dálaigh was criticised by the Defence Minister for submitting a bill to the 
Supreme Court for a ruling on its constitutionality. The minister offered to resign 
for having criticised the President, but the Taoiseach (prime minister) refused to 
accept the minister's resignation. Feeling isolated, President Ó Dálaigh stepped 
down. The president was perfectly entitled to send the bill to the Supreme Court 
and he did not have to leave office. However, he felt that he had not been 
supported by the political class and preferred to resign. 
 Even though presidents serve for a fixed term, all constitutions have a 
clause that allows them to be impeached and dismissed from office. The 
conditions vary, but usually they require some claim that the president has acted 
unconstitutionally. To date, only one European president has been impeached, 
though impeachment has been avoided only narrowly on two further occasions. 
In 2004 President Rolandas Paksas of Lithuania was impeached (Clark and 
Verseckaitė 2005). He was accused of having contacts with Yuri Borisov, a 
Russian businessman who allegedly had links with organised crime. A special 
parliamentary commission ruled that the accusation was accurate. The 
Constitutional Court then found President Paksas guilty of violating the 
constitution and breaking his oath. In parliament, deputies voted on the charges 
and the two-thirds majority necessary for impeachment was passed by just one 
vote. This is the only case when a president has been obliged to step down 
prematurely. However, in Romania there have been two impeachment attempts 
(Gherghina and Miscoiu 2013). Both concerned President Traian Băsescu. In 2007 
a hostile majority in parliament voted to suspend President Băsescu from office 
for supposedly violating the constitution. In this case, the Romanian constitution 
requires that a referendum be held to impeach the president. In May of that year, 
nearly 75 per cent of those voting in the referendum voted against impeaching 
the president and he remained in power (Tanaescu 2008). A similar situation 
occurred in 2012. Again, President Băsescu faced a majority opposed to him in 
parliament and once again he was suspended. This time, nearly 90 per cent of 
those voting in the referendum voted to impeach the president. However, less 
than 50 per cent of registered electors turned out to vote. Therefore, the result of 
the referendum was invalid and President Băsescu again remained in power. In 
Latin America, there is some evidence that impeachment has increasingly been 
used as a way of ousting unpopular presidents (Marsteintredet and Berntzen 
2008). In Europe, this situation has not occurred, but the Romanian example 
shows that it is possible. If it were to occur, then it would most likely do so only 
in countries where the president is a relatively powerful political actor. This is 
because the presidential stakes are higher in these countries, leading parties to 
calculate that in some circumstances the risk of undermining the institution of 
the presidency by an act of presidential lèse-majesté may be outweighed by the 
benefits to be gained from winning the presidency at the subsequent election. 
Here, then, is another example where the power of the office helps to explain 
variation in political practice across the set of European Heads of State. 
 
The power of Heads of State 
 
On a number of occasions we have seen that the power of Heads of State helps to 
explain various differences in the way in which European political systems 
operate. So, what powers do they have? (Table 17.5 provides a basic ranking of 
presidents in terms of their powers). 
 Table 17.5 The power of European presidents about here. 
 The first distinction we need to draw is between monarchies and republics. 
As noted above, in monarchies the Head of State no longer has any real influence 
over the political process. In these countries, the head of government (the prime 
minister) is the main political figure within the government. All the same, we 
need to distinguish between the formal constitution and actual constitutional 
practice. Formally, monarchs often exercise great power in some areas. For 
example, with the exception of Sweden (Roobol 2011: 284), the approval of the 
monarch in still needed for a bill to become law. In theory, this means that 
monarchs have veto power. By convention, though, this power is never used. 
That said, in Belgium in March 1990 King Baudoin informed Prime Minister 
Wilfried Martens that his conscience would not allow him to sign a bill that 
partially legalised abortion (Prakke 2006: 141-143). However, the King also 
acknowledged that it was unacceptable for him to veto a bill passed by the 
legislature. To resolve the problem, the Council of Ministers voted to declare the 
King unable to rule, meaning that it had the power to sign the bill into law, 
which it duly did, and then convened parliament the next day to declare Baudoin 
once again able to rule. Generally, the one area where we might still see the 
residual influence of the monarch is in the process of government formation. 
Again with the exception of Sweden, in European monarchies the king or queen 
formally nominates the prime minister-designate who then proceeds to form a 
government. Usually, the monarch's choice is determined in advance by the 
result of the legislative election or by post-election negotiations between political 
parties. However, it is not unimaginable that in particular circumstances there 
may be no obvious prime ministerial candidate and the monarch's decision could 
be influential (Saalfeld 2003: 648). For example, in 2010 the Dutch general 
election returned a parliament without a clear-cut majority. Queen Beatrix was 
advised to nominate representatives (or informateurs) from two parties each of 
whom would engage in negotiations to form a new government. However, she 
decided to nominate only one, seemingly signaling her preference for a 
particular type of coalition. In the end, new informateurs had to be appointed as 
the process of government formation proved particularly difficult. However, the 
Queen's choice could have been decisive. Indeed, in 1994, when a similar 
situation occurred, Queen Beatrix also went against advice and appointed an 
informateur who ended up becoming Prime Minister (De Winter: 126). So, the 
formal powers of the monarch may be slightly more than completely residual in 
this regard. That said, such examples are very rare and do not threaten the 
democratic norms on which the regime is founded. Instead, the monarch's role is 
now purely social and cultural, acting as a figurehead around which citizens can 
unite in times of national disaster, for example. Thus, the point stands that if 
monarchs were to intervene substantively and unilaterally in the political process, 
then there would quickly be a backlash. 
 We can see, therefore, that in parliamentary monarchies kings and queens 
play no substantive role in the political process. Instead, in these countries prime 
ministers are the main political actors within the executive. In parliamentary 
republics the prime minister is also the main political actor. However, even the 
weakest indirectly elected presidents have the potential to exercise more 
influence than any monarch. For example, in Germany where the president has 
very few powers at all and where, as we saw, one president resigned because he 
was criticized for merely commenting on the political process, the Federal 
President still has the implicit power to refuse to countersign bills passed by the 
legislature. This power is used very sparingly. Indeed, it has been invoked only 
ten times since 1949. However, when we compare even this very restricted use of 
the president’s veto power to the constitutional consternation caused by King 
Baudoin of Belgium’s moral dilemma in 1990, we can see that indirectly elected 
presidents play a fundamentally different role in the political process from 
monarchs. They may be weak, but they can legitimately exercise whatever power 
they may have. What is more, Tavits (2008) has shown that even the weakest 
indirectly elected presidents can be quite consequential political actors. One area 
where they sometimes intervene is in their capacity as the 'guardian of the 
constitution'. This power often expresses itself when presidents veto bills passed 
by the legislature, or at least when they send bills back to the legislature for 
further consideration. For example, in Latvia President Valdis Zatlers returned 
14 bills to the legislature from 2007-2011. President Václav Klaus of the Czech 
Republic was particularly active in this regard, returning no fewer than 63 bills to 
parliament from April 2003 to November 2012. More than that, presidential 
power can sometimes be more significant still. For example, in Hungary 
President Árpád Göncz was persistently in conflict with the government in the 
years immediately following the collapse of communism (O’Neil 1993). In Italy, 
Pasquino (2012: 848) has shown that prior to 1993 Italian presidents exercised 
little more than "moral persuasion". Since this time, though, they have become 
more significant political actors. For example, in April 1993 President Oscar Luigi 
Scalfaro found himself “totally unconstrained” (ibid. 849) in his choice of prime 
minister and government ministers. Italian presidents have also become more 
involved in the general process of legislation since this time. President Carlo 
Azeglio Ciampi had a habit of “active and decisive intervention in the course of 
parliamentary proceedings” that “essentially transformed him into an 
authoritative and influential co-legislator” (Grimaldi 2011: 116). The Italian case 
is particularly instructive because it demonstrates that variation in presidential 
power is largely determined by variation in party politics. Here, the collapse of 
the party system in the early 1990s provided the president with a “huge window 
of opportunity” (Pasquino 2012: 847) to exercise political influence. In general, 
therefore, we can say that even if the prime minister is the main actor within the 
executive in parliamentary republics, we should not discount the role of 
indirectly elected presidents. 
 In semi-presidential and presidential countries the situation is more 
varied. As Tavits (2008) has amply demonstrated, the direct election of the 
president does not mean that the president will necessarily be a powerful 
political actor. As Table 17.5 shows, some of the very weakest presidents are 
directly elected. In these countries, the prime minister is, once again, the 
dominant political actor within the executive. The weakness of certain directly 
elected presidents is partly due to the small number of constitutional powers that 
are invested in the office. Presidents in the Balkans are now notable in this regard. 
In the period following independence in 1990 Croatia adopted a constitution 
with a very strong president. However in 2001 almost all of the president’s 
powers were taken away, bringing Croatia into line with other countries in the 
region. For example, even though they are directly elected, the presidents of 
Slovenia and Croatia do not even have the power to request parliament to 
consider a bill for a second time. The president of Slovenia in particular plays 
little more than a ceremonial role, though with some powers to influence the 
process of government formation. That said, the president of Slovenia retains the 
right to speak out on matters of political concern and presidents have locked 
horns with the government over controversial issues (Krašovec and Lajh 2008: 
213). However, as in parliamentary systems, ultimately the government decides. 
In part, the weakness of some directly elected presidents is also due to the 
historical conditions in which certain presidencies were established (Duverger 
1980). For instance, in Iceland the president has many constitutional powers. 
However, rather like a monarchy, by convention these powers are not used. The 
president is an almost entirely figurehead institution. In Ireland, the president 
has many fewer powers but only one, the power to send a bill to the Supreme 
Court for a judgment on its constitutionality, has been used with any regularity 
and even then, as we saw, on one occasion the use of this power provoked a 
crisis that led to the resignation of the incumbent president. In both countries the 
creation of a presidency was a symbolic political act, replacing the position of a 
monarch or a monarch’s appointed representative in the constitutional system. 
The aim was not create an executive presidency and the first incumbents 
understood that their role was almost exclusively ceremonial. This tradition has 
lasted. Even so, rather like the situation with indirectly elected presidents, there 
are times when even very weak directly elected presidents can exercise some 
influence. In Iceland the president’s refusal to sign a bill passed by parliament 
automatically triggers a referendum to decide whether or not the bill should 
become law. This power was not used for 50 years until in 1994 President 
Grímsson invoked the power for the first time. On that occasion, the government 
withdrew the bill before a referendum could held. However, President Grímsson 
has since vetoed legislation on two further subsequent occasions and both times 
in the ensuing referendum the people have supported the president and voted to 
reject the bill passed by parliament. Overall, though, we can consider the power 
of indirectly elected presidents and very weak directly elected presidents in 
essentially the same way. 
 In some countries, though, directly elected presidents are more powerful 
political actors. This is most notably the case in Cyprus where, it has been 
asserted (Ker-Lindsay 2006: 33), the president “exerts more influence over [the] 
state” than the equivalent leader in any country in the European Union. The 
situation in Cyprus is unusual and not merely in a European context. Article 46 
of the 1960 Constitution states that “executive power is ensured by the President 
and the Vice-President of the Republic”. Indeed, according to the Constitution, 
the Vice-President is an important political figure with effective veto power over 
most key issues. Article 1 of the 1960 further states that the President shall be 
elected by the Greek Cypriot community and that the Vice-President shall be 
elected by the Turkish Cypriot community. Therefore, the 1960 Constitution 
established a form of ethnic power-sharing. However, in 1963 conflict broke out 
between the two communities on the island and the Turkish community’s 
involvement in the political system ended. As a result, even though the 
Constitution continues to refer to the Vice-President, the position has remained 
unoccupied ever since. In practice, this means that sole executive authority has 
resided in the presidency. More generally, the president’s position is increased 
by the popular perception that the president is the ethnarch, or national leader, of 
the Greek Cypriot people (ibid: 28). This position “further intensifies and 
reinforces the sense that speaking out against the president is not just 
disrespectful, it is an act against the community at large” (ibid: 29). 
In France, there is no shortage of people willing to criticize the president, 
but there is still no doubt that under normal circumstances the president is the 
main actor in the political process (Elgie 2013). Here, the president has some not 
insignificant constitutional powers, especially in foreign affairs, but Article 20 
states that the “government shall determine and conduct the policy of the 
nation”, while Article 21 states that the prime minister “shall direct the actions of 
the government”. So, constitutionally the prime minister would seem to be the 
key figure within the executive. However, party politics renders the situation 
very different. In the legislature there is a usually a “presidential majority”, 
meaning a majority that is loyal to the president rather than the prime minister. 
This means that the president can appoint a loyal prime minister who has the 
support of the legislature and who will direct the actions of the government on 
the president’s behalf. What is more, in France more than in any other European 
country with the exception of Greece the presidential election is the key moment 
in the political process. For example, presidential elections determine the policy 
agenda. So, not only can the president appoint a loyal prime minister, the 
president can be assured that the prime minister will implement the president’s 
policies. Thus, party politics rather than constitutional powers ensure that the 
French president is usually a more political actor within the system than the 
prime minister.  
In Romania, the situation is similar. However, Romanian presidents have 
tended to exercise power despite rather than because of political parties, which 
are typically ill-disciplined and which fail to guarantee a stable parliamentary 
majority (Gallagher and Andrievici 2008). That said, like the situation in 
countries with indirectly elected presidents, in France and Romania presidential 
power can vary considerably. Here, the main factor is whether or not the 
president enjoys a supportive parliamentary majority or whether there is a 
majority actively opposed to the president. In the latter case, the majority will 
appoint a prime minister and cabinet who are also opposed to the president and 
will pass legislation prepared by the government. In these circumstances, the 
president no longer has any political allies in the executive. This is known as 
‘cohabitation’. On these occasions, the president can only react to the 
government’s decisions, losing almost all influence over policy. In France since 
1958, there have been three periods of cohabitation – 1986-88, 1993-1995, and 
1997-2002. In Romania since 1991, there have been two periods – 2007-2008, and 
2012-2013. During these periods, relations within the executive between the 
president, on the one hand, and the prime minister and cabinet, on the other, can 
be very fraught. It is no coincidence that both attempts to impeach President 
Băsescu occurred during periods of cohabitation. 
In France and Romania, periods of cohabitation weaken the presidency. 
Elsewhere, though, cohabitation can strengthen the president. In this regard, 
Portugal, Bulgaria, and Poland are good examples. Outside cohabitation, the 
prime minister is usually the party leader and the president is a lesser party 
figure. This means that the prime minister leads the parliamentary majority and 
is dominant within the executive, whereas the president is a secondary figure 
exercising little effective power. However, when there is cohabitation the prime 
minister still leads the parliamentary majority but the president now provides 
the main party political opposition to the prime minister within the executive. 
This brings the president to prominence. For example, in 2004 President Sampaio 
of Portugal engineered the dissolution of the legislature during a period of 
cohabitation, allowing new elections to be held that returned his party to 
government (Amorim Neto and Costa Lobo 2009). In Bulgaria presidential vetoes 
increase under cohabitation as the president tries to stymie the opposition 
government. In Poland the 1997 Constitution reduced the president’s powers. 
Ordinarily, the president is now a secondary political figure. However, during 
cohabitation the president is still a nuisance figure for the government. For 
example, as in Bulgaria, the use of presidential vetoes increases under 
cohabitation (ibid: 382). Thus, we see that a combination of constitutional powers 
and presidential politics helps to explain why cohabitation has different 
consequences in different countries. 
 In general, therefore, there is great variation in the powers of European 
heads of states. To all intents and purposes, monarchs are always powerless. By 
contrast, indirectly presidents usually have a certain degree of influence and on 
some occasions may have rather more latitude. Even so, they operate within a 
system in which, like parliamentary monarchies, the prime minister is the 
dominant actor within the executive. The same can be said about countries with 
very weak directly elected presidents. Here again, prime ministers are dominant 
within the executive, though presidents can exercise influence under certain 
conditions. However, in a handful of countries the president is generally the 
dominant political actor. In Cyprus this is always the case, not least because there 
is no prime minister in the system. In France and Romania the president is 
usually the dominant actor, but under cohabitation power shifts to the prime 
minister. This variation in the power of European heads of states is caused by 
differences in constitutional powers, the presence or absence of behavioural 
norms, and, most importantly, and shifting patterns of party politics both in the 
country generally and in the legislature specifically. 
 
Conclusion: European heads of state 
 
On 13-14 December 2012 27 heads of state and government attended the 
biannual meeting of the European Council in Brussels. This meeting is a good 
indicator of where power lies in EU member state executives. At this meeting, 
there were 23 heads of government, four presidents and no monarchs. The 
presidents who attended were from Cyprus, France, Lithuania and Romania. In 
the past, the presidents of Finland and Poland have also regularly attended 
equivalent meetings, but they are now represented by their country's prime 
minister. We have also seen that Croatia, the newest member of the EU, is 
represented at European Council meetings by its prime minister. If we try to 
imagine who would represent the non-EU countries covered in this survey, then 
Switzerland would be represented by its president, not least because there is no 
prime minister, but all the other countries would almost certainly be represented 
by their prime minister. Indeed, if Switzerland was represented by its president, 
it would not be a sign that the country had a powerful president. The Swiss 
president is elected by parliament, has very few powers, and serves for only one 
year with the post rotating between the seven members of the country's cabinet. 
  These figures are instructive. They indicate that monarchs and indirectly 
elected presidents are not expected to play a significant role in the policy-making 
process. In fact, as we have seen, monarchs are not expected to play any role 
whatsoever. These figures also indicate that directly elected presidents are not 
necessarily the centre of political attention in European executives. In only a 
handful of countries is this the case. Indeed, in Lithuania the head of state 
attends meetings of the European Council because the constitution specifically 
states that the president "shall represent the state" (Art. 77) rather than because 
the presidency is in charge of policy making at home. In that regard, the 
Lithuanian prime minister is much more important. What is more, if there is a 
trend, then it is towards less powerful directly elected presidents. In 1982 
Portugal significantly reduced the power of its president. In Poland and Croatia, 
equivalent changes were made in 1997 and 2001 respectively. In Finland the 
powers of the president have been reduced by so much since 2000 that the 
Finnish president is now merely an Irish-style figurehead. In Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic direct presidential elections were introduced in 1999 and 2013 
respectively, yet the power of these presidents was not increased accordingly. 
Thus, two additional weak but directly elected presidents were added to the 
European list. These changes merely underline the point that the mode of 
election is not a good predictor of presidential power in Europe. 
This is not to say that indirectly elected presidents and weak directly 
elected presidents do not matter. As we have seen, all presidents have more 
opportunity to influence the political process than any monarch. More than that, 
if the party political conditions are right, then both indirectly elected presidents 
and weak directly elected presidents have the opportunity to exercise a more 
substantive influence. Their role might be one of behind-the-scenes "moral 
persuasion", or as the "guardian of the constitution" exercising veto power, as a 
more constructive partner in decision-making with the government, or 
sometimes as a troublemaker, making life difficult for the government and the 
parliamentary majority. For example, in 2013 the Czech Republic switched from 
indirect to direct presidential elections, thus becoming semi-presidential. The 
Czech president is a largely figurehead institution. However, when the Czech 
government collapsed in July 2013 the first directly elected president, Miloš 
Zeman, was able to appoint his preferred candidate as interim prime minister 
and then generate a parliamentary dissolution when the government failed to be 
ratified by parliament. The Czech president is very weak, but by pushing his 
powers to the limit President Zeman was able to manufacture the outcome that 
he was looking for. Thus, the role of indirectly elected presidents and weak 
directly elected presidents should not be discounted. However, in only a handful 
of European countries is the Head of State a truly powerful political actor. The 
presidents of Cyprus, France and to a lesser extent Romania stand out in this 
regard. These countries have executive presidents, meaning that the president is 
the main figure within the governmental system. Even here, though, party 
politics can shift decision-making power to the prime minister. When this 
happened in Romania in 2012 there was a fierce political row between the 
president and the new prime minister as to who should represent Romania at the 
December European Council meeting. 
 Overall, we can say that presidential power is on the wane in Europe. This 
does not mean that directly elected presidents are out of fashion. Quite the 
contrary, the norms of representative liberal democracy point in that direction. 
However, we are unlikely to see a shift to executive presidencies in Europe any 
time soon. The development of the EU itself is consistent with this general point. 
Although the EU is a sui generis organisation, the position of the President of the 
European Commission more closely resembles that of an active indirectly elected 
president than a true executive presidency. Indeed, if there was ever to be a 
President of the European Union, then it is not inconceivable that such a position 
would be directly elected by the citizens of Europe. If this were the case, though, 
we can be fairly sure that the office would be more of a figurehead institution, 
acting as the guardian of the Treaties, than a real policy-making actor. In this 
event, such a president would behave in a way that would be familiar to the vast 
majority of European citizens. 
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Table 17.1 Types of political regimes in Europe 
 
Parliamentary 
 Assembly-
independent 
Semi-
presidential Presidential Monarchies Republics 
 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
Albania 
Estonia 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Italy 
Kosovo 
Latvia 
Malta 
Switzerland Austria 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Rep 
Finland 
France 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Montenegro 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Serbia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Cyprus 
 
 
  
Table 17.2 The number of ballots required to elect the president in 
parliamentary republics 
 
Country Year of 
first 
election 
No. of 
elections  
Average 
no. of 
ballots 
Highest no. 
of ballots 
Lowest no. 
of ballots 
Albania 2002 3 3 4 1 
Estonia 1992 5 3.4 5 1 
Germany 1949 15 1.9 4 1 
Greece 1975 8 2.3 5 1 
Hungary 1990 3 1.7 3 1 
Italy 1948 11 9.5 23 1 
Kosovo 2011 2 2 3 1 
Latvia 1993 6 2.3 6 1 
 
Note: No information is available for Malta. The figures for Hungary are from 
2005 inclusive. 
 
  
Table 17.3 The number of candidates at the first ballot of presidential 
elections in parliamentary republics 
 
Country Average no. 
of candidates 
Highest no. of 
candidates 
Lowest no. of 
candidates 
No. of 
elections with 
only one 
candidate at 
the first 
ballot 
Albania 1.3 2 1 2 
Estonia 2.8 4 1 1 
Germany 3.3 8 1 1 
Greece 2 6 1 4 
Hungary 1.7 2 1 1 
Italy 11.5 18 5 0 
Kosovo 1.5 1 1 1 
Latvia 2.2 4 1 2 
 
Notes: No information is available for Malta. The figures for Hungary are from 
2005 inclusive onwards. The figures for Italy exclude so-called ‘voti dispersi’.  
 
  
Table 17.4 Direct presidential elections in Europe 
 
Country Year of 
first 
election in 
dataset 
No. of 
elections 
Average 
no. of 
candidates 
at the first 
round 
Average 
effective 
no. of 
candidates 
at the first 
round 
No. of 
elections 
with only 
one 
candidate 
Austria 1951 12 3.1 2.1 0 
Bulgaria 1992 5 13 3.1 0 
Croatia 2000 3 11.3 4.2 0 
Cyprus 1968 10 5.3 2.3 2 
Czech Rep 2013 1 9 5.7 0 
Finland 1950 11 7.2 3.7 0 
France 1969 8 10.6 5.0 0 
Iceland 1945 18 1.9 1.5 10 
Ireland 1938 13 2.3 1.9 6 
Lithuania 1993 5 7.6 3.4 0 
Macedonia 1994 4 4.5 3.5 0 
Montenegro 2008 1 4 2.9 0 
Poland 1995 4 11.8 3.4 0 
Portugal 1976 8 4.6 2.4 0 
Romania 1996 4 13 3.9 0 
Serbia 2008 2 10.5 4.8 0 
Slovakia 1999 3 9.7 3.3 0 
Slovenia 1992 5 7 3.0 0 
 
  
Table 17.5 The power of European presidents 
 
Country Method of election Score (0-1) 
 
Cyprus Direct 0.75 
France Direct 0.44 
Romania Direct 0.39 
Croatia Direct 0.33 
Iceland Direct 0.33 
Portugal Direct 0.33 
Lithuania Direct 0.32 
Poland  Direct 0.29 
Albania Indirect 0.27 
Hungary Indirect 0.27 
Estonia Indirect 0.25 
Italy Indirect 0.25 
Macedonia Direct 0.19 
Ireland Direct 0.18 
Czech Republic Direct 0.17 
Finland Direct 0.17 
Malta Indirect 0.17 
Slovakia Direct 0.15 
Bulgaria Direct 0.14 
Austria Direct 0.13 
Latvia Indirect 0.13 
Serbia Direct 0.10 
Slovenia Direct 0.10 
Montenegro Direct 0.08 
Germany Indirect 0.06 
Greece  Indirect 0.06 
 
The scores are calculated as the mean of the standardized scores of three 
measures of presidential power, e.g. Shugart and Carey (1992), Siaroff (2007), and 
Tavits (2008). The scores are a mix of constitutional presidential powers and 
presidential powers in practice. 
